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During the past quarter century, monetary authorities in developed coun-
tries have been remarkably successful at reducing and stabilizing inﬂation.
Fluctuations in output have also been less severe than they were in earlier
decades, leading commentators to coin phrases such as “the great moder-
ation” or “nice decade.”1 However, the same period has seen major ﬂuctu-
ations in asset markets, most obviously the sustained bull market in equi-
ties during the 1980s and 1990s, the boom and subsequent bust in
technology stocks during the late 1990s and early 2000s, the dramatic in-
crease in house prices in the ﬁrst few years of this century, and, most re-
cently, falling house prices and rising commodity prices.
Central bankers have always paid some attention to asset prices in con-
nection with their mission of ensuring the soundness of the banking sys-
tem. In the United States, for example, the Federal Reserve took measures
to choke oﬀ the stock price boom of the late 1920s, provided liquidity after
the stock market crash of 1987, and helped to engineer the bailout of the
hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. Recently, however,
there has been increased interest in the relevance of asset prices for macro-
economic stability. The chapters in this volume, presented at a National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) conference at the Wequassett Inn
in Chatham, Massachusetts, on May 5–6, 2006, explore the relationship
between asset prices and monetary policy from this point of view.
Several chapters in the volume ask what monetary authorities can learn
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1. “Nice” stands for noninﬂationary consistently expansionary, an acronym due to Gover-
nor Mervyn King of the Bank of England.from asset markets. These chapters treat asset prices not as ultimate goals
of monetary policy, nor as variables that can be directly controlled, but as
indicators of macroeconomic conditions to which monetary authorities
can respond.
Stephen G. Cecchetti opens the volume with an empirical analysis of eq-
uity markets in twenty-seven countries and housing markets in seventeen
countries. He ﬁnds particularly strong linkages between housing markets
and the macroeconomy. Housing booms predict strong economic growth
in the near term, weak economic growth in the longer term, and relatively
high inﬂation. Cecchetti argues that central bankers are and should be par-
ticularly concerned about extreme negative outcomes; they act as macro-
economic risk managers. Accordingly, Cecchetti evaluates the relation be-
tween equity and housing booms and extremely high inﬂation or low
output. He ﬁnds that both types of booms worsen the distribution of worst
outcomes (measured as the mean within the lower 25 percent tail of the
output distribution or the upper 25 percent tail of the inﬂation distribu-
tion). There is some evidence that the equity market eﬀects are stronger,
and housing eﬀects are weaker, in economies with market-based ﬁnancial
systems and high ratios of stock market capitalization to gross domestic
product (GDP). Cecchetti uses these results to argue that traditional aca-
demic analysis, which looks at the ﬁrst two moments of output and inﬂa-
tion, understates the importance of asset prices for the practice of central
banking.
Central bankers will have greater conﬁdence responding to asset prices
if they understand what structural forces are driving them and how these
forces aﬀect output and inﬂation. One common view is that prices are
driven by exogenous shocks to investor beliefs or preferences that have
little or nothing to do with underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. In
1996, Alan Greenspan famously used the phrase “irrational exuberance”
to describe a positive shock of this sort. An alternative view is that asset
markets reﬂect evolving beliefs about the long-run prospects for the econ-
omy, particularly the trend rate of productivity growth.
The second chapter in this volume, by Simon Gilchrist and Masashi
Saito, builds a model that embodies this alternative view. Their model con-
tains a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
1999); that is, high asset prices increase the collateral of entrepreneurs and
lower the cost of external funds for investment. Gilchrist and Saito evalu-
ate several alternative monetary policies using a quadratic loss function in
the output gap and inﬂation. They ﬁnd that a policy of aggressive inﬂation
targeting is less than ideal because, while it stabilizes inﬂation, it allows the
ﬁnancial accelerator to destabilize output. When expected productivity
growth accelerates, asset prices rise, external funds become cheap, and in-
vestment and output increase by more than they would do in a frictionless
economy. The monetary authority can oﬀset this by calculating and re-
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prices and the level that would prevail in a frictionless economy. The bene-
ﬁts of such a policy are particularly large if the monetary authority has bet-
ter information about long-run growth than does the private sector. How-
ever, Gilchrist and Saito caution that an uninformed central bank can do
damage if it responds naively to the level of asset prices, because such a pol-
icy will tend to produce inﬂation when there is a productivity slowdown,
and deﬂation when productivity growth accelerates.
Tommaso Monacelli’s chapter also emphasizes the role of collateral in
debt markets. Monacelli points out that in an economy in which some
households are borrowing-constrained, welfare increases if the constraints
are relaxed. The central bank should take this eﬀect into account when for-
mulating optimal monetary policy. Monacelli argues that it may be appro-
priate for a central bank to allow some surprise inﬂation when there is a
temporary improvement in productivity. At such a time, borrowing con-
straints tend to bind more tightly, but if households have long-term nomi-
nal debt, inﬂation oﬀsets the eﬀect by eroding the real value of outstanding
debt. However, Monacelli concedes the dominant importance of the stan-
dard argument for price stability in an economy where prices are costly to
adjust. Monacelli goes on to consider the role of durable goods in provid-
ing collateral for household debt. He argues that constrained households
tilt their consumption ineﬃciently toward durable goods, particularly
when constraints are unusually tight, and that this increases the volatility
of durable goods prices. Optimal monetary policy should have stability in
the relative price of durable goods as an objective, balancing this against
the objective of stability in nondurables price inﬂation.
Monika Piazzesi and Martin Schneider present a novel explanation for
the volatility of house prices. They emphasize that house price booms oc-
curred in many countries both in the 1970s, when inﬂation was high, and
in the 2000s, when inﬂation was low. To explain this phenomenon, they
suggest that some households are confused about the distinction between
real and nominal interest rates, while other households understand it. This
causes disagreement about the level of real interest rates at times when in-
ﬂation is unusually high or low. In the 1970s, confused or “illusionary”
households perceived high real rates, while rational households perceived
low rates; in the 2000s, this pattern was reversed. Households that perceive
low real rates wish to borrow, but Piazzesi and Schneider argue that in or-
der to do so, they must invest in housing as collateral. Accordingly, dis-
agreement about real interest rates drives up house prices. Shocks to inﬂa-
tion, whether positive or negative, have the potential to generate housing
booms.
Asset prices can be informative not only about the state of the real econ-
omy, as emphasized by Gilchrist and Saito and Monacelli, and inﬂation, 
as emphasized by Piazzesi and Schneider, but also about the stance of 
Introduction 3monetary policy itself. This feedback from monetary policy to asset mar-
kets signiﬁcantly complicates the task of central bankers who must decide
how to respond to asset price movements. The chapter by Hans Dewachter
and Marco Lyrio asks how the prices of long-term nominal government
bonds respond to the macroeconomy and to the perceived stance of mon-
etary policy. Dewachter and Lyrio point out that a standard structural
macro model, in which investors are assumed to know the parameters of
the model, is unable to explain the volatility of long-term interest rates. Be-
cause long rates are determined primarily by the long-run equilibrium real
interest rate and the inﬂation target of the monetary authority, both of
which are constant, the standard model implies that long rates are also
close to constant. To generate realistic movements at the long end of the
yield curve, Dewachter and Lyrio assume that bond market investors be-
lieve that the equilibrium real interest rate and long-run inﬂation target
change over time and update their estimates of these variables using a
Kalman ﬁlter. The authors ﬁt their model to U.S. market data on nominal
interest rates, together with survey data on inﬂation expectations. In an ex-
tended version of the model, they allow parameters to change when the
chairmanship of the Federal Reserve changes. Dewachter and Lyrio ﬁnd
that learning about monetary policy is the main factor driving the prices of
long-term nominal bonds.
If bond prices are determined by investors’ beliefs about monetary policy,
it is natural to ask how the monetary authority can shape those beliefs to
improve its control over the yield curve. Glenn D. Rudebusch and John C. 
Williams discuss one approach that has been used recently by the cen-
tral banks of New Zealand and Norway, the publication of a projected fu-
ture path for the short-term interest rate that is directly controlled by the
monetary authority. This approach goes signiﬁcantly beyond the informal
verbal discussion of the possible direction of policy that has been used re-
cently by the Federal Reserve. Rudebusch and Williams analyze a simple
New Keynesian structural model in which the public is uncertain about the
central bank’s inﬂation target or about the parameters of the policy rule
that the bank uses to respond to macroeconomic shocks. They assume that
the monetary authority cannot communicate these parameters directly but
can release noisy forecasts of future short-term interest rates. They ﬁnd
that releasing interest rate projections generally improves the public’s un-
derstanding of monetary policy, with beneﬁcial results for macroeconomic
stability. It is, however, possible that the policy can backﬁre, destabilizing
the economy, if the public greatly overestimates the accuracy of the central
bank’s interest rate forecasts.
Recent increases in the price of oil and other mineral and agricultural
commodities have renewed interest in the link between commodity prices
and monetary policy. Jeﬀrey A. Frankel’s chapter points out that, in theory,
the world real interest rate is an important inﬂuence on commodity prices.
4 John Y. CampbellIn equilibrium, the convenience yield of an inventory of commodities, plus
the expected rate of real commodity price appreciation, must equal the real
interest rate. Thus, a high real interest rate requires expected commodity
price appreciation, which, in turn, requires a low commodity price today.
Frankel presents evidence that this eﬀect is important for many commodi-
ties. To the extent that the real interest rate is hard to measure directly be-
cause expected inﬂation is unobservable, commodity prices provide an im-
portant clue that should be used by monetary authorities.
Frankel goes on to argue that monetary policy should pay special atten-
tion to the prices of commodities that are exported or imported. He criti-
cizes the policy of targeting consumer price inﬂation, which is currently
used by many central banks around the world, on the ground that this pol-
icy does not properly handle shocks to the terms of trade. For example, a
Consumer Price Index (CPI)-targeting oil importer facing an increase in
the world price of oil is required to tighten monetary policy to oﬀset the
eﬀect of the oil shock on domestic consumer prices, but Frankel argues
that this policy worsens the real eﬀect of the oil shock on the macroecon-
omy. Instead, Frankel suggests that monetary policy should stabilize an
index of export prices or producer prices.
The last two chapters in this volume study the eﬀects of macroeconomic
announcements on asset prices. Empirically, this is an attractive strategy
for identifying the reaction of asset prices to macroeconomic variables be-
cause other inﬂuences on asset prices have relatively small eﬀects during
the short periods of time around announcements. Roberto Rigobon and
Brian Sack highlight a diﬃculty with the standard methodology for mea-
suring announcement eﬀects and propose a novel methodology to solve it.
They point out that only the surprise component of a macroeconomic an-
nouncement should move asset markets, but this surprise component is
measured with error because surveys of prior consensus forecasts are noisy
and typically outdated. To correct for the eﬀect of measurement error, they
argue that other inﬂuences on asset prices should create equal asset-price
variance in announcement periods and other equally short periods when
announcements do not occur. If this is true, a comparison of variances pro-
vides additional information that can be used to identify the true an-
nouncement eﬀect, even in the presence of announcement measurement
error. Implementing their methodology, Rigobon and Sack ﬁnd larger an-
nouncement eﬀects than previous studies have done. The pattern of these
eﬀects is, however, familiar, with positive growth or inﬂation announce-
ments driving up interest rates at all maturities and positive inﬂation an-
nouncements driving down stock prices.
Richard H. Clarida and Daniel Waldman ask how the exchange rate re-
acts to news about inﬂation. There are oﬀsetting eﬀects because inﬂation
lowers the long-run equilibrium nominal exchange rate but may also lead
the monetary authority to increase the short-run nominal interest rate, cre-
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Clarida and Waldman show that in a simple monetary policy model pro-
posed by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002), an optimizing central bank
tightens aggressively in response to inﬂation news and thereby induces an
exchange rate appreciation. Thus the announcement eﬀect of inﬂation on
the exchange rate can be used to learn about the stance of monetary policy,
speciﬁcally, how close it is to an optimal policy. Empirically, Clarida and
Waldman show that inﬂation announcements do tend to cause exchange
rate appreciation, particularly in countries with explicit inﬂation targeting
policies. In the United Kingdom and Norway, countries that moved in the
direction of inﬂation targeting in 1997 and 2001, respectively, the authors
ﬁnd that the exchange rate response to inﬂation also changed in the direc-
tion predicted by their model.
Central bankers face the diﬃcult task of integrating these and other in-
sights into their decision-making process. The volume concludes with a
fascinating panel discussion among three distinguished practitioners:
Governor Donald L. Kohn of the Federal Reserve; former Governor Lau-
rence H. Meyer, now vice chairman of Macroeconomic Advisers LLC; and
William C. Dudley, advisory director of Goldman, Sachs & Co. Of course,
all three panelists express their personal views and not those of their insti-
tutions.
The three panelists share the view that asset markets periodically de-
velop “bubbles,” upward price movements that cannot easily be justiﬁed by
fundamentals and that often end in sharp declines. Governor Kohn con-
trasts the “conventional strategy” of responding to bubbles only insofar as
they change expected output or inﬂation in the medium run, with a strat-
egy of “extra action” that seeks to use monetary policy to dampen emerg-
ing bubbles. He characterizes extra action as a form of insurance against
adverse consequences from the collapse of a bubble that is allowed to de-
velop but argues that three conditions must be met for this insurance to be
worth buying. First, the monetary authority must be able to identify an
emerging bubble reliably and in real time. Second, contractionary mone-
tary policy must reliably dampen the bubble. And, third, dampening the
bubble must have substantial beneﬁts for macroeconomic stability. Gover-
nor Kohn argues that these conditions have not been met in recent years in
developed countries and are unlikely to be met in the future.2
Both Laurence H. Meyer and William C. Dudley are more sympathetic
to policies of taking extra action against asset price bubbles.3 Dudley ar-
gues that seasoned market observers can identify emerging bubbles in a
timely manner. He agrees with Kohn that conventional monetary policy is
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2. Governor Kohn’s position appears to be close to those of the former and current Federal
Reserve chairmen, Alan Greenspan (2002) and Ben Bernanke (2002).
3. In this respect, they are closer to the position expressed in a recent article published by
the European Central Bank (2005).ill-suited to dampen speculative activity in long-term asset markets but
suggests that the monetary authority has alternative policies that may be
more eﬀective. Speciﬁcally, the central bank should regularly publish as-
sessments of fair value in equity markets and should tighten margin re-
quirements when a bubble appears to be developing. In addition, it would
be helpful if the monetary authority had greater authority over capital ad-
equacy and disclosure requirements for ﬁnancial institutions. Meyer
agrees that the central bank must regularly communicate its concerns
about asset values with the public and argues that the monetary authority
should at least err on the side of restraint when it perceives the emergence
of an asset price bubble.
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